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determines what conditions need to be in place for it to embark on its journey, and the conditions under which it stops.
Second example. A human being takes in food, and its nature (its soul) determines how it changes in response to this food-it grows, and distributes the food accordingly. The soul also determines what limits there are to the growth of a human. We do not just grow and grow as we eat, unlike a fire, which just grows and grows as more and more is fed to it: 'while the growth of fire goes on without limit so long as there is a supply of fuel, in the case of all complex wholes formed in the course of nature there is a limit or ratio which determines their size and increase' (DA . ,  a -). Hence the soul is also a principle of rest, in the sense that it determines when certain processes stop, and is responsible for maintaining those end-states when they are achieved. Now, if something's nature is its principle of change and rest, then obviously a study of Nature (or some preliminary to it) has to get to grips with what principles are, and what change and rest are. So it is no surprise that in his Physics Aristotle investigates not just questions concerning how many principles there are (Physics )  and what sorts of principles there are (. ), but also the definition of (. -) and preconditions for () motion and the other kinds of change, namely qualitative change (i.e. alteration), quantitative change (i.e. growth and diminution), and substantial change (i.e. when something comes into being or passes out of being). In books - Aristotle explores further features of change, including whether it is continuous, whether it has contraries, how to individuate changes, whether it can go on for ever, etc.
 But Aristotle also investigates what happens when an object transitions from resting to changing, and from changing to resting, and this is no surprise given that nature is a principle of both change and rest.
. Does change harbour paradox?
Given the central importance of the concept of change in Physics, the student of nature would do well to ensure that the notion does  Books , , and  might even originally have formed a separate treatise with a title reflecting this, namely 'On Change' (Περὶ κινήσεως). See Ross, Physics, loc. cit. not harbour paradox, and can be invoked without danger in the sciences. In particular, the student of nature should not simply assume that just because we happily use the concept of change in our everyday speech, it is conceptually unproblematic. For instance, Aristotle is very concerned in the Physics to 'clean up' the concept of being somewhere, or being in a place, and provide a thorough account of what a place is, even though we unthinkingly invoke the concept in our ordinary speech.
 But if a particular concept cannot be made precise, or can be shown to be of no conceptual use, e.g. the concept of being empty (discussed in Physics . -), Aristotle is prepared simply to reject its use. (Aristotle notoriously thinks there is no such thing as being absolutely empty.) If it turns out that we can make no sense at all of what it is for something to change, or start to change, or stop changing, or be at rest, then we should not use these notions in our physics or biology, on pain of framing theorems invoking those concepts which will turn out to be false or even nonsense.
This last point is particularly important. One of Aristotle's main goals in his study of nature is to get clear about what the soul is, i.e. what feature it is that marks out animate bodies from inanimate ones. What is distinctive of the soul is that only those bodies which possess a soul can engage in certain changes, e.g. growing, swimming, eating, sneezing, and indeed it is precisely because those bodies have a soul that they engage in these changes. But if the whole notion of a 'change' turns out to be problematic-if it turns out that the things we want to say about motion and change are illfounded-then characterizing the soul as that which is responsible for certain changes will, in turn, be unacceptable. We will be left without an adequate characterization of the soul, and without the right to continue to conceive of certain bodies as ensouled. There could be no biology. Similar considerations apply to astronomy, as Aristotle conceives of it.
In Physics  Aristotle offers a definition of what change is, but it is in Physics  and  that he engages in a sustained discussion of the properties of changes, what the different types of change are (. , ), how to individuate them (. ), which changes are contrary to which (. The discussion of Zeno's paradoxes helps illustrate the claim that in books  and  Aristotle is, among other things, considering the suitability of the concept of change for physics. For if that claim is true, it is easy to see why Aristotle needs to confront the paradoxes: they are challenges which must be met if we are to understand what change or motion is. For instance, they appear to threaten Aristotle's oft-repeated tenet that all changes are changes from something to something,  since on Zeno's picture, changes can never come to completion. Zeno appears to open up the possibility that changes could go on for ever without ever reaching their endpoint. It is surely no coincidence either that the important point Aristotle makes in other contexts about certain activities (energeiai), namely that, unlike changes (kinēseis), they can go on for ever, also appears to be threatened by Zeno's never-completing changes.

Many of the questions in Physics  concern the relation between time and change. Motion takes time. If I drop a stone and it falls to the ground, the falling takes a certain amount of time. The fact that changes, processes, or whatever take time marks them out from the natural bodies which themselves undergo these changes. For a stone does not take a certain amount of time. What takes time is the stone's doing something, e.g. falling to earth, but the stone itself does not take time. This connection between change and time is not coincidental; Aristotle actually defines time in terms of change (specifically, as the number of change in respect of the before and after).

But because changes or processes take time, we wonder how much time they took, i.e. how long they lasted. And in addition, we enquire into when they occurred, which will be a matter of determin- ing when they started and when they finished. This will often be precisely in order to determine how long they lasted. But there might be other reasons why the student of nature wishes to know when a particular change occurred, i.e. when a particular body underwent a change, for instance in order to determine what the conditions obtaining in the environment of that body were when the change was initiated.
In the chapter of Physics  which is the main focus of this paper, namely . , Aristotle is particularly interested in two central whenquestions which one might raise concerning change: when something started changing, and when it finished changing. Quite apart from the purely chronological question of when these things occurred, we want to know whether there are some mysterious states apart from motion and rest (as it were, the states of 'getting going' or 'coming to rest'). And if so, do natural bodies have a principle to be in those states too? Do objects move seamlessly from change to rest and back to change again? Just as we students of natural philosophy need to be clear about what happens when one body is in contact with another-about how a body relates to the rest of the world, and how the parts of a body relate to one another-so we need to be familiar with the structure of change, and how changes and periods of rest relate to each other.
We tend to think that we have a firm grasp of what change, or kinēsis, is, according to Aristotle, even if his definition of it in Physics .  is famously obscure. In part, this is because we are confident of our understanding of the ordinary English word 'change', so that even if we might find it hard to define that word, we are able to use it without too much reflection. However, one of the lessons of Aristotle's discussions of kinēsis in book  is that we need to be more cautious in our use of the word. We use the word 'change' to cover a wider range of phenomena, e.g. in locutions such as 'at that point, the water changed into ice'. But this transition, from water to ice, is not a change according to Aristotle. It is the culmination of a change, and happens instantaneously, whereas according to Aristotle, all changes take time (i.e. take place over a stretch of time). The change which culminated in the water becoming ice was the cooling or freezing of the water, and that did take a certain amount of time. Thus, for Aristotle, there are transitions which are not changes. (This is one reason some have preferred to translate kinēsis as 'process' and not 'change'.)
These transitions provide yet another reason for being wary of the so-called Cambridge definition of what it is to change, namely that x has changed just when something is true of x at one time and false of x at another. This (failed) definition is already infamous for allowing for 'mere Cambridge' changes, such as when Socrates is taller than Theaetetus at one time and shorter than him at a later time, without his having himself changed height. But the definition will also certify as changes more subtle examples of transitions which will turn out not to be Aristotelian processes. If it is true at t  that x is changing, and true at t  that x has come to rest, it most certainly does not follow, according to Aristotle, that x has undergone a change from changing to resting. (Mutatis mutandis, if it has gone from resting to changing.) Among other aspects of change, Physics  examines in detail the nature of these transitions from rest to change, and from change to rest, neither of which are themselves changes.
The importance of the observation that for Aristotle kinēsis is much narrower than might at first appear cannot be overstated. For it is a corollary of this view that to say that something is not subject to change leaves open that the thing in question engages in transitional switches which are not changes. And so when Aristotle claims that the soul is not subject to kinēsis (DA . ,  a ),  this does not rule out switches such as, for instance, those from perceptual inactivity to perceptual activity.  Biology will be riddled with examples of such switches or transitions. Small wonder, then, that Physics  takes upon itself a close study of the conceptual range of the notion of kinēsis.
. Changes have no beginning, but they do have an end: traditional reconstruction
Here is the central stretch of text that will concern me in this paper: ΑΓ, καὶ διῃρήσθω κατὰ τὸ Β. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ ΑΒ μετα-βέβληκεν ἢ πάλιν ἐν τῷ ΒΓ, οὐκ ἂν ἐν πρώτῳ τῷ ΑΓ με-ταβεβληκὸς εἴη. εἰ δ᾿ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ μετέβαλλεν (ἀνάγκη γὰρ  a  ἢ μεταβεβληκέναι ἢ μεταβάλλειν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ), κἂν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ μεταβάλλοι· ἀλλ᾿ ἦν μεταβεβληκός. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λό-γος καὶ εἰ ἐν τῷ μὲν μεταβάλλει, ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταβέβλη-κεν· ἔσται γάρ τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον· ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη διαι- a  ρετὸν ἐν ᾧ μεταβέβληκεν. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐφθαρμέ-νον καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν ἀτόμῳ τὸ μὲν ἔφθαρται τὸ δὲ γέ-γονεν.
λέγεται δὲ τὸ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ μεταβέβληκε διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἐπετελέσθη ἡ μεταβολή (τότε γὰρ ἀλη-θὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι μεταβέβληκεν), τὸ δ᾿ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἤρξατο με-
ταβάλλειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ τέλος τῆς μεταβολῆς πρῶ-τον λεγόμενον ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἔστιν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐπιτε-λεσθῆναι μεταβολὴν καὶ ἔστι μεταβολῆς τέλος, ὃ δὴ καὶ δέδεικται ἀδιαίρετον ὂν διὰ τὸ πέρας εἶναι)· τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς, οὐδ᾿ ἐν
ᾧ πρώτῳ τοῦ χρόνου μετέβαλεν.  ἔστω γὰρ πρῶτον ἐφ᾿ ᾧ τὸ ΑΔ. τοῦτο δὴ ἀδιαίρετον μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν· συμβήσεται γὰρ ἐχόμενα εἶναι τὰ νῦν. ἔτι δ᾿ εἰ ἐν τῷ ΓΑ χρόνῳ παντὶ ἠρε-μεῖ (κείσθω γὰρ ἠρεμοῦν), καὶ ἐν τῷ Α ἠρεμεῖ, ὥστ᾿ εἰ ἀμε-ρές ἐστι τὸ ΑΔ, ἅμα ἠρεμήσει καὶ μεταβεβληκὸς ἔσται· ἐν  a  μὲν γὰρ τῷ Α ἠρεμεῖ, ἐν δὲ τῷ Δ μεταβέβληκεν. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμερές, ἀνάγκη διαιρετὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν τούτου μεταβεβληκέναι· διαιρεθέντος γὰρ τοῦ ΑΔ, εἰ μὲν ἐν μηδε-τέρῳ μεταβέβληκεν, οὐδ᾿ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ· εἰ δ᾿ ἐν ἀμφοῖν μετα-βάλλει καὶ ἐν τῷ παντί, εἰ δ'  ἐν θατέρῳ μεταβέβληκεν,  a  οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ πρώτῳ. ὥστε ἀνάγκη ἐν ὁτῳοῦν μεταβεβλη-κέναι. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ μεταβέ-βληκεν· ἄπειροι γὰρ αἱ διαιρέσεις.
[ b ] Therefore it is clear that that which has changed, when primarily it has changed, is in that to which it has changed: but the primary time in which that which has changed has changed must be indivisible. I call 'primary' that which is such-and-such not in virtue of something other than it being such-and-such. For let [ b ] AC be divisible, and let it have been divided at B. If then it has changed in AB or again in BC, AC cannot be the primary time in which it has changed. If, on the other hand,  I read μετέβαλεν here with E  FK, rather than μετέβαλλεν, which Ross prints. More on this below.
 Reading εἰ δ᾿ (with the manuscripts) instead of Ross's εἴτ᾿.
it was changing in both (for necessarily [ a ] it must either have changed or be changing in both of them), then it would be changing in the whole too; but our assumption was that it had changed. The same argument applies too if it is changing in one part but has changed in the other: for there will be something prior to what is primary. Therefore [ a ] the time in which it has changed cannot be divisible. Thus it is clear that both that which has been destroyed and that which has come into being have been destroyed and have come into being in an indivisible time.
'The primary time in which something has changed' is said in two ways. In one, it is the primary time in which the change finished (for at that point it is true to say that it has changed), and in the other it is the primary time in which the thing started [ a ] to change. The one that is said to be primary in relation to the end of the change is both real and exists (for it is possible for a change to finish, and there is an end of a change, which has in fact also been shown to be indivisible since it is a limit), whereas the one in relation to the start of the change does not exist at all, for there is no beginning of a change, at least there is no [ a ] primary part of the time in which it embarked on change. For let the primary time be AD. Then this is not indivisible. For then the nows would be next to each other. Again, if it were at rest in the whole of the stretch of time CA (for let us grant that it is at rest), then it would be at rest in A too, with the result that if AD  is partless, it will simultaneously be at rest and have changed; [ a ] for it is at rest at A and has changed at D. But if AD is not partless, it must be divisible and it must have changed in any part of it whatsoever, for suppose AD is divided, then if it has changed in neither part, it will not have changed in the whole either, and if it is changing in both, it is changing in the whole too, and if it has changed in one or the other, [ a ] the whole will not be the primary time in which it has changed. So it must have changed in any part whatsoever. It is clear then that the primary time in which the thing has changed does not exist. For the divisions are endless.
The basic structure of this text is as follows. In the first section,  b - a , Aristotle proves-or attempts to prove-that something he terms 'the primary time in which that which has changed has changed'  must exist and be indivisible.  In the second section,  a -, Aristotle specifies that the phrase to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken ('the primary time in which something has changed')  There is a misprint ('AC') at this point in the revision of Hardie and Gaye's translation of the Physics in J. Barnes (ed.) 
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Excited by Aristotle's claim that a change has no beginning, commentators have attempted to reconstruct his argument, and have almost uniformly understood him to mean the following: there is no first instant or moment of a change. I shall be arguing that Aristotle does not mean that and does not assert that, and I shall be examining the relevant text more closely in a moment. But an orthodox version of the argument is worth laying out.
The argument is supposed to go like this. Suppose that x is at rest, and then moves. Suppose further that there is a last moment, t  , at which x is at rest. Then let the first moment at which x is moving be t  . Either t  is previous to t  , or t  = t  , or t  is after t  .
(Step ) If t  were previous to t  , then there would be a period of time, namely from t  to t  , during which x would be both at rest and in motion, which is impossible. (Step ) If t  were identical to t  , then at that instant, x would be at rest (because t  is the last moment of rest), and x would be in motion (because t  is the first moment of motion). But this is impossible. (Step ) But if t  were after t  , then, since two instants cannot be consecutive-rather, they must bound a period of timethere would be a period of time between t  and t  during which x would be neither in motion, nor at rest, which is impossible.
So t  is not previous to t  , nor identical with t  , nor after t  . Therefore it does not exist. This does indeed have the makings of a really good paradox. There are two important assumptions lying behind it.
(a) It is supposed that 'x is in motion' and 'x is at rest' are contradictories-they cannot be true together and yet one must be true. (b) It is supposed that time is a continuum, and that instants are like points on a line, in that between any two points there is another point.
I do not intend to take issue with either of these assumptions; Aristotle endorses them both and that is good enough for my purposes here. One of the things I want to do in this paper is cast doubt on whether Aristotle ran the argument in the form just given. My first doubt is that the argument given is arbitrary, in this re-spect: it established only that if there is a last moment of rest, then there is no first moment of motion. In other words, it only establishes a conditional, and not the desired claim (the consequent of the conditional). One way of seeing why this matters is that if we hypothesize the contrary of the antecedent (that there is no last moment of rest), we could perfectly well hypothesize a first moment of motion, without contradiction. But there is no hint of an appreciation of this in Aristotle's text. My second doubt is that when we turn our attention to the other end of the change, we can use exactly the same form of argument to argue from the assumption that there is a last moment of motion, to the conclusion that there is no first moment of rest. However, Aristotle definitely does not do this. He argues that the end of a change and the beginning of the subsequent period of rest coincide, and occur instantaneously. (I shall say more about this later.)
My third doubt is that nowhere does Aristotle ever talk of the first or last moment of change or rest using an expression involving the word for an instant (nun).
 He uses a locution which sounds similar to this-but is not identical, and is in fact crucially different. That locution is to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken ( b -;  a ), which I have translated as 'the primary time in which it has changed'. This phrase does not refer to an instant as a matter of its meaning, and nor does it refer to something which is first-at least, not if by that we are to understand temporally first. Or so I shall argue.
One reason for thinking that Aristotle is not referring to the first instant of a change when he uses this locution is quite simply that he does not use the Greek word for 'instant' (nun) in it. But even if this does not convince you, there is irrefutable proof that the phrase to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken is not supposed to be understood in its very meaning as referring to an instant, and that is that Aristotle undertakes to prove that the time en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken (when that phrase is understood to refer to the end of a change) is not a stretch of time but is an instant ( b - a ). If that phrase simply meant 'the first instant in which the thing has changed' vel sim., then it would be entirely otiose-and scarcely intelligible-to prove that this was not a stretch of time (and the argument would look very different from the complex one that Aristotle actually gives at  b - a ). Moreover, Aristotle also proves that the time en hōi prōtōi  'The first instant of change' would presumably correspond to an expression such as τὸ τῆς μεταβολῆς πρῶτον νῦν.
metabeblēken (when that phrase is understood to refer to the beginning of a change) is neither an instant ( a -) nor a stretch of time ( a -). Again, if the phrase simply meant 'the first instant in which the thing has changed' vel sim., then it would be entirely otiose to prove that it was not a stretch of time, and mystifying to prove that it was not an instant.
But in fact it should be obvious that Aristotle is not using the word prōton to refer to temporal priority, because his explanation for what the word prōton does mean in this context makes this explicit ( a -): 'I call "prōton" that which is such-and-such but not in virtue of something other than it being such-and-such.'  Whatever this means, it does not even sound like a definition of 'first' in the sense of 'temporally first'. A better translation would be something like 'primary', in the sense of 'logically primary', or perhaps 'primary in being' or something like that. This sense of the word needs some explanation, which I shall now attempt to provide. Indeed, once we have understood how Aristotle intends the word prōton to be understood, we will see immediately why it is that we should not introduce talk of instants either. Every changing thing changes in a stretch of time, but changing in a stretch of time can be understood as meaning either in a primary stretch of time, or in respect of some other stretch of time (e.g. something changes in some year in virtue of the fact that it changes on some day). So the primary stretch of time in which a changing thing changes is such that necessarily the thing is changing in any part of it whatsoever.
The point behind this is the following. Suppose someone asks me: 'When did you go to the City?'. I might reply: 'In '. 'When in ?', he persists. 'On December th', I reply. It is in virtue of the fact that my journey to the City occurred on  December  that it occurred in . The 'in virtue of' here (hoti) captures the fact that from 'I went to the City on  December ' we can infer 'I went to the City in ', but not vice versa. (There are plenty of things  λέγω δὲ πρῶτον ὃ μὴ τῷ ἕτερόν τι αὐτοῦ εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἐστιν. which happened in  but which did not happen on  December .) So, as Aristotle puts it in the text just quoted, the change (my journey to the City) took place in some year () in virtue of the fact that it took place on some day of that year ( December). Now, in Aristotle's terminology,  is not the primary time of my journey to the City, since there is a part of  in which my journey occurred, namely  December . Now in fact,  December  is not the primary time either, since my journey did not occur during the whole of that time, but only in the evening of  December. Even then, we could be more precise about when my journey took place within that stretch (between . p.m. and . p.m., or whatever).
What I mean by being 'more precise' is the following. I specified the time of my journey as (first)  (call this time A), (then)  December  (call this time B), (then) the evening of the fifth (time C), and (finally) the stretch between . p.m. and . p.m. on that day (time D). In so doing I specify the time of my journey more and more precisely, in this sense: anything which happens in time B happens in time A but not vice versa, so B is a more precise time-stretch than A. Similarly, anything which happens in time C happens in time B but not vice versa, so C is a more precise timestretch than B. Likewise, anything which happens in time D happens in time C but not vice versa. So D is the most precise out of all the given time-stretches.
Let us assume that D is the most precise stretch of time for the journey. In that case, it qualifies as the primary time in which the journey took place, since I was engaging in my change (journeying to the City) at every substretch of it (as Aristotle puts it in the text above: 'necessarily the thing is changing in any part of it whatsoever'). Moreover, there is no part of my journey which lies outside that stretch of time either. Hence, that stretch of time exactly fits my journey: it is the most precise specification possible of when my journey took place. That stretch of time D has an important property: any stretch of time which includes D will be a true answer to the question 'when did the journey take place?'. Possible answers include: winter ; the second decade of the twenty-first century; the twenty-first century itself; etc. Thus, the primary stretch of time (D) in which the change took place has explanatory value; we can explain why any true answer to the question 'when did the journey take place?' is true by adverting to the fact that the timestretch specified in that answer includes D.
There is a parallel for this in Physics . -, Aristotle's account of place.
 Aristotle holds that everything which has a place has a primary place-i.e. a most precise place. Special features of this place include the following: it must contain nothing besides that of which it is the primary place (Physics . ,  b ). Aristotle thinks that a corollary of this is that it must be a surface, and in fact he famously says that x's primary place is 'the inner surface of x's surroundings'. The importance of x's primary place, p, is that since p is x's most precise place, it is in virtue of the fact that x is in p that x is in anything at all. So, for instance, I am in the air at the moment in virtue of the fact that I am in this surface of air. Anything in this surface of air is in the air, whereas it is not the case that anything in the air is in this surface of air.
I do not want to discuss here the merits of Aristotle's remarks about place.
 What is important for our purposes is that Aristotle refers sometimes to x's primary place as that in which x is non-derivatively (kath' hauto), the contrast being with those things which x is in derivatively (kath' heteron or kat ' allo -, Aristotle was addressing the question of when something is changing, i.e. when a change occurs. Since changes take time, the question 'when did the change occur?' can be answered truly only by a specification of a stretch of time (Aristotle's word for a stretch of time is chronos), hence why Aristotle points out that 'every changing thing changes in a stretch of time' ( b ). But of course, some things happen instantaneously, and do not take time. For instance, my arrival in the City is a good candidate for being just such an instantaneous occurrence. (As we shall see, Aristotle is very interested in such occurrences.) But notice that there is exactly the same structure to possible answers to the question 'When did he arrive in the City?'. There are more or less precise answers to the question ('in ', 'on December th'), and there will be a most precise answer (one which specifies the exact instant at which I arrived). This most precise answer will be the primary time at which I arrived. In this case, the primary time of the relevant occurrence is not a stretch of time (a chronos) but rather an instant (a nun). So although some true answers to the question 'when did he arrive?' will specify stretches of time (answers such as ''), those answers will be true because they contain the primary time of my arrival (namely a certain instant which is contained in ).
Taking into account that things which happen can be either changes or instantaneous occurrences such as arriving, we can point to the following parallels between what Aristotle says about place, and what he says about time:
(a) A body x is in a place P in respect of something else iff x is in P but there is something y in which x is such that y is part of P and x is in y. (a) A change/occurrence x is in a time T in respect of something else iff there is something y in which x is such that y is part of T and x is in y.
(b) A body x is in a place P primarily iff x is in P but there is nothing else y in which x is such that y is part of P and x is in y. (b) A change/occurrence x is in a time T primarily iff x is in T but there is nothing else y in which x is such that y is part of T and x is in y.
The notion, then, of a primary time in which some change/ occurrence x happens is thus far from being simply a matter of the first moment at which x happens, or something like that. There is no explicit mention of moments at all, nor is there is any hint of first moments. The primary time of an event E (an occurrence or a change or whatever) is the time AB-either a stretch of time (A≠ B), or an instant (A=B)-such that E occurs in AB, and no part of E occurs at any time outside AB, and such that there is no stretch of time CD which is a part of AB in which E is not taking place. . Or, to put this another way, there is no way to specify precisely when something does enough changing to count as having changed, i.e. when it transitions from rest to change, but there is a way to specify precisely when it transitions from change to rest. That this is what Aristotle is doing should be uncontroversial; he tells us in  a - that this is exactly what he is going to do. But what demands explanation is how Aristotle can claim that the single locution, to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken, can refer to either the primary time in which something began to change, or the primary time in which something finished changing. This is what I want to linger on in this section, before investigating in the next section the two arguments that Aristotle gives for his twin claims (that there is no primary time at which it started to change, but there is a primary time at which it finished changing).
Aristotle is clear that to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken, which literally means 'the primary [time] in which something has changed', can be taken in two quite different ways ( a -):
λέγεται δὲ τὸ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ μεταβέβληκε διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἐπετελέσθη ἡ μεταβολή (τότε γὰρ ἀλη-θὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι μεταβέβληκεν), τὸ δ᾿ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἤρξατο με- 'The primary time in which something has changed' is said in two ways. In one, it is the primary time in which the change finished (for at that point it is true to say that it has changed), and in the other it is the primary time in which the thing started to change.
There are two puzzling features in Aristotle's elucidation of the double meaning of the phrase to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken. (i) How on earth can one and the same phrase manage to refer both to the start of a change and to the finish? (ii) How can it be that a phrase which contains the perfect form 'has changed' (metabeblēken) can have its meanings unfolded by phrases containing aorist forms, namely 'finished' (epetelesthē) and 'started' (ērxato)?
 After all, the Greek perfect typically captures the idea that something is in a certain state, a state which has been reached as a result of the past performance of the action specified by the relevant verb. The aorist, on the other hand, simply states that an action occurred in the past, viewing that action as a whole, and saying nothing about the agent's current condition.
We should note that the ambiguity Aristotle points to is all due to the meaning of the word metabeblēken. For the phrase which is said to have two meanings is to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken, and yet the string of words en hōi prōtōi appears in the elucidations of both of the two meanings: to en hōi prōtōi epetelesthē hē metabolē, and to en hōi prōtōi ērxato metaballein. So it is not the word prōtos which is responsible for generating the two meanings. Therefore it must be all down to the word metabeblēken. But before we get into clarifying what metabeblēken means, we first have to decipher the grammar of the whole phrase to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken. It is a noun phrase formed by the article followed by a relative clause, but there is no explicit antecedent for the relative pronoun. It is clear that in English one has to supply a noun such as 'time' as antecedent for en hōi prōtōi. Now, one must remember that the word 'time' is not here translating the word chronos. Aristotelian Greek lacks a word which is neutral as between 'stretch of time' (chronos) and 'instant of time' (nun), a word which would be genus, as it were, to those two species. But it is easy to see that the phrase to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken must  Strobach (Moment, ) states correctly that 'μεταβέβληκεν is in one sense synonymous with ἤρξατο μεταβάλλειν; in another sense it is synonymous with ἐπετελέσθη ἡ μεταβολή', and offers the following terse explanation for what is going on: the distinction between two types of aorist (ingressive and perfective) is 'transferred into the two different meanings of μεταβέβληκεν' ( n. ). In my text I offer a fuller and somewhat different explanation.
be neutral in its meaning as between 'stretch of time' and 'instant', because when denying the existence of the primary time in which something started to change, Aristotle proves that it can be neither an instant nor a stretch of time.

Since the word prōtōi in our phrase is in apposition to the relative pronoun, it is easiest to render the phrase in English by taking it outside the relative clause, supplying the missing noun, to give us the following rendering of to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken: 'the primary time in which the thing has changed'. So now, we must look at the Greek perfect form metabeblēken. It means something like this: 'x is in a state of having changed'. As Goodwin  puts it in his description of the Greek perfect: 'The Perfect represents an action as already finished at the present time' ( § .); '[I]t implies the performance of the action in the past time, yet states only that it stands completed at the present time' ( § . Note ). The perfect tense has perfective aspect.
 So, for instance, to ask 'when primarily something has changed'-hote metabeblēken prōton (cf. . ,  b ; )-is to ask when primarily something is in the state of having changed. Since this state can endure for a while, this would be to ask when exactly the thing is in the state of having changed.
But what about to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken? Is this a phrase referring to the time when the thing is in the state of having changed? The answer is no. To see this, we have to notice something about the English perfect. As Comrie puts it: 'in English, the Perfect may not be used together with specification of the time of the past situation, i.e. one cannot say I have got up at five o'clock this morning, because the specific reference to the point of time at five o'clock this morning is incompatible with the English Perfect'.  However, Comrie points out that other languages do allow for perfect forms  Hence one should absolutely resist the temptation to translate the phrase τὸ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ μεταβέβληκεν as 'the first instant in which something has changed', or 'le premier 〈moment〉 dans lequel ce qui a changé a changé', as Pierre Pellegrin to be modified by adverbial phrases specifying when the relevant action or event took place, and produces examples from Spanish and Russian; he also points out that in English you can achieve the same result if you add the specification 'as an afterthought': 'I have been to Birmingham, last week in fact'.
 I submit that when Aristotle wonders in what time something has changed, he is wondering when it got the changing done that qualifies the thing as having changed, much as we might wonder, if someone says 'I have been to Birmingham', when it was that they went to Birmingham. When we ask when they went there, we are asking when the event took place which qualifies them as now being in the state of having been to Birmingham-when the event took place which qualifies them now as being past-Birmingham-visitors. (This is distinct from asking, for instance, how long they have been in the state of being pastBirmingham-visitors.)
In Greek, can temporal adverbial phrases, modifying perfect verbs, play this role of specifying when the relevant action took place which put the object in the current state expressed by the perfect? I think they can, and I think we get a prime example elsewhere in Physics . Consider the following claim in Physics . : 'Everything which is moving must be in a state of having moved previously' ( b -).
 The adverb 'previously' (proteron) modifies the perfect infinitive 'be in a state of having moved ' (kekinēsthai) . But what is being said to have occurred previously is not the state of having moved-that state is current-but rather the moving which put the thing in its current state of having moved. So the adverb 'previously' is modifying a perfect form, but it refers to the time when the relevant action itself took place, rather than to when the thing is in the condition of having performed the action. Similarly, I claim, our key phrase 'the time in which primarily the thing has moved' is referring to the time in the past when the object which is currently in the state of having moved got the moving done which makes it count as now being in the state of having moved.
Thus, the basic meaning of metabeblēken is 'x is in a state of having changed', and the phrase en hōi prōtōi is inviting us to specify exactly (prōtōi) when x engaged in the change which put it in the we specify some time in which the relevant event or action occurred-we can say 'I have seen Fred today'-'provided that the time includes the present' (ibid.).
 Ibid. -.  πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη κεκινῆσθαι πρότερον.
state of (now) having changed. Now we have an answer to one of the puzzles about the phrase to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken, namely why it is that Aristotle feels he can gloss its meanings using verbs in the aorist, given that the verb in the phrase is perfect. The answer is that the phrase refers to the time when the object in question performed the change (aorist) which makes it true that it now counts as having changed (perfect). The change in aspect is to be explained in a similar way to the explication of why there is a change in aspect in English when I ask when it was that you went to Birmingham (aorist), after learning that you have been (perfect) to Birmingham; I am asking when you performed the change, i.e. going to Birmingham, which makes it true that you now count as having changed, i.e. as having been to Birmingham.
So far so good. But we still have not generated the double meaning that Aristotle insists the phrase to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken has, whereby it can refer both to the start and to the end of a change. For that, we need to introduce one further complexity. We have to note that Aristotle starts Physics .  with the following observation: 'every changing thing changes from something to something' ( b -).
 Every change, in other words, has a starting-point and an endpoint. When x changes, x changes from having F predicated of it to having G predicated of it, where 'F' and 'G' may name places (in which case the change in question is locomotion), or qualities (in which case the change in question is alteration), etc. To put things slightly less clumsily: when x changes, x changes from being F and x changes to being G. I draw attention to Aristotle's observation because we have to note that there are three different things we might say about x, each of them using the verb 'to change': 'x changes', 'x changes from being F ', and 'x changes to being G'. Thus, when Aristotle uses the verb form metabeblēken, he might have in mind any one of three different things: () 'x has changed' (as in 'x has undergone its entire change', or 'x has changed from being F to being G'), () 'x has changed from being F ', and () 'x has changed to being G'. These statements have different truth conditions. In the middle of the change in question, for instance, () is false, as is (), but () is true.
Thus, there are in fact three different things that Aristotle could mean by the phrase to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken. It could mean () the primary time in which x did the changing necessary to put it into a state of having changed from F to G (of having completed the whole change, in other words), or () the primary time in which x did whatever is necessary to put it into the state of having changed from F, or () the primary time in which x did whatever is necessary to put it into a state of having changed to G. In our passage, we have Aristotle using the phrase in senses () and (). Thus, Aristotle glosses one meaning of to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken as to en hōi prōtōi epetelesthē hē metabolē: the primary time in which the change finished. This is the primary time in which x did whatever is necessary to put it into a state of having changed to being G (meaning ). And he glosses the other meaning of to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken (the other meaning relevant for our passage) as to en hōi prōtōi ērxato metaballein: the primary time in which the change started. This is the primary time in which x did whatever is necessary to put it into a state of having changed from being F (meaning ). If I am right about this, then we would expect Aristotle somewhere to use the locution 'the primary time in which x has moved' in sense ()-i.e. to refer to the exact time in which the whole change took place (a stretch of time, necessarily). Here, the perfect 'x has moved' would mean 'x is in the state of having completed the whole change'. And we do get just this, in Physics . , where Aristotle, in the course of another long and involved argument, says: 'If something has changed [kekinētai] in the primary time XR over the magnitude KL, then . . .' ( b -). Here, the primary time in which the thing in question has changed (kekinētai) is the primary time in which the whole change took place-the primary time in which the thing changed from being F to being G (that Aristotle has the whole change in mind is clear from the fact that there is a magnitude specified over which the thing has changed, and the change in question occupies the stretch of time XR). Thus, I contend, we find in Physics  all three uses of the perfect in conjunction with a temporal adverbial modifying phrase of the form 'in such-and-such a time'. Each time, the temporal modifier specifies when the item in question performed whatever is necessary to put it into the state of having changed, where this state might be any of these three: having changed from F, having changed to G, or having changed from F to G.
As I said above, English cannot easily use these temporal modifying phrases with the perfect, so it is difficult to render some of these formulations in idiomatic English. However, it is possible to find examples in English of the use of the phrase 'x has moved' to mean both 'x has moved from being F ' and 'x has moved to being G'. Suppose I am on a train, which is sitting at the station, and I am waiting for the train to leave; I might exclaim, when the train has finally left, 'we have moved!'. But suppose that the ticket inspector now comes up to me and tells me to move seats (perhaps I am sitting in the wrong one); I get up and move from that seat to another, and I tell him 'OK, now I have moved'. In the first case, my utterance is supposed to capture the fact that we have started to move; in the second case, my utterance is supposed to capture the fact that I have completed the move (to another seat).

So I hope to have offered explanations for (i) why the phrase 'the primary time in which something has changed' has two meanings, referring to both the end and the start of the change, and (ii) why Aristotle employs the aorist forms 'finished' and 'started' in unpacking those two meanings, despite the presence of the perfect form 'has changed' in the phrase itself.
With this groundwork, we can turn to the substantive philosophical claims that Aristotle is going to make concerning the primary time in which something started changing and the primary time in which something finished changing. What Aristotle will claim is that we cannot pinpoint when something started changing, i.e. did the changing necessary to count as having changed, whereas we can pinpoint exactly when the thing completed the change. Or, to use the examples from the train, we cannot pinpoint when the train did what is necessary to count as having moved from its starting-point, but we can pinpoint when it was that I did what is necessary to count as having moved to my new seat. -) we are concerned only with what happens at the end of a change, and we do not suspect that we are going to turn our attention to the beginning of a change. But that is what happens at  a -, when Aristotle observes the ambiguity in the phrase to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken, and observes that when this phrase refers to the end of a change, there is such a thing as the primary time in which the thing has changed, but when it refers to the beginning of a change, there is no such primary time. Then, in  a -, he gives the proof for this latter claim. Thus we need to start with Aristotle's proof in  b - a  that there is a primary time in which something has changed, where this can be paraphrased as something like the following claim: when something changes from being F to being G, there is a primary (i.e. most precise) time in which something makes the transition to having changed to being G. His argument that there is such a primary time, and that it is indivisible, is actually rather difficult.
Here is the complete argument ( b - a ):
the primary time in which that which has changed has changed must be indivisible. I call 'primary' that which is such-and-such not in virtue of something other than it being such-and-such. () For let AC be divisible, and let it have been divided at B. () If then it has changed in AB or again in BC, AC cannot be the primary time in which it has changed. () If, on the other hand, it was changing in both (for necessarily it must either have changed or be changing in both of them), then it would be changing in the whole too; but our assumption was that it had changed. () The same argument applies too if it is changing in one part but has changed in the other: for there will be something prior to what is primary. () Therefore the time in which it has changed cannot be divisible.
The form of this argument is a reductio: the supposition that the primary time in which the thing completes the change is divisible is shown to be impossible, by examining the various different possibilities for that scenario and ruling each out; Aristotle then infers that the primary time in which the thing completed the change must be indivisible. We can see immediately that there is a problem with this reasoning: it presupposes that the primary time in which the thing completes its change actually exists. When Aristotle discusses the primary time in which something started its change, he shows that it can be neither divisible nor indivisible; here, where he discusses the end of the change, there is only a proof that the primary time in which the thing finished changing cannot be divisible. None the less, we can follow through the details of the proof. First, we assume that () the primary time AC is divisible, and we divide it at B; in other words, we assume first (for reductio) that AC is a stretch of time, not an instant. () But if the thing in question transitions to its endpoint in either AB or BC, then AC could not be the primary time of this transition, since there would be a part of it (AB or BC) in which the transition was made. (Suppose I journeyed from Princeton to New York City on Monday; I left at . in the afternoon and arrived at . in the evening. Is the stretch of time from . to . the primary time of my arrival? No, because we can divide it into two parts at ., and see that I arrived in one of the parts; hence . to . is not the primary time of my arrival.) () But any putative primary time of the completion of the change cannot be one in which the object is in motion throughout the stretch of time (i.e. is at every instant still in motion): for then it does not complete the change in that stretch. (Aristotle assumes that when it completes the change it is no longer in motion.) So if it is changing across both parts of AC, then AC is not after all a stretch of time in which it makes the transition to having changed. () Aristotle continues rather perplexingly by talking again about the first case, when the thing has changed in either AB or BC.
 He says: 'The same argument applies too if it is changing in one part but has changed in the other; for there will be something prior to what is primary.' If, for instance, the thing is changing in AB but then transitions to having changed in BC, then AC is not the primary time of the transition, since BC is prior to it. The thing will be changing in AC derivatively; to be more precise, it is changing in BC, and therefore changing in AC derivatively. (It is a rather strange feature of this argument that Aristotle is apparently prepared to al- Ross: 'Aristotle by oversight adds this as if it were a separate case' (ad loc).
low that the thing may have changed in AB but then be changing in BC.)
From all of this Aristotle draws the conclusion that AC must be indivisible-i.e. an instant, on the grounds that he has exhausted all the possible options if AC is divisible. Now, as I said earlier, this argument seems only to show the following: if there is a primary time in which the thing has changed, then it must be indivisible.
 Take any stretch of time during which something completes its change. For example, imagine again I go from Princeton to New York City, and that I arrive in New York early in the evening (at . p.m.). Let us stipulate that an evening begins at . p.m. (instant A) and ends at . a.m. (instant B), and let us divide it into two halves, at . p.m. (C). Then BC is not the primary time at which I completed the journey to New York, since I arrived in AC. Now concentrate on AC, and divide that at an instant D, and so on. What guarantee do we have that this division will come to an end at an instant or a point? We know that any stretch of time we take will fail to be the primary time in which I completed the journey (that is what the argument we have just looked at establishes-or purports to establish), but we have no argument as yet that there will actually be an instant at which I arrive. I do in fact think that such an argument can be constructed along Aristotelian lines-and I shall give it later in this paper (see below, Section )-but Aristotle's actual argument at this point in the text seems to be incomplete. I wish I knew of an interpretation according to which he would have offered a plausible argument for this here, but there does not seem to be one.
. The beginning of the change
Meanwhile, there is the question of the beginning of a journey, which Aristotle turns his attention to at  a . As I said earlier, Aristotle starts by pointing out that the phrase to en hōi prōtōi metabeblēken is ambiguous, and by pointing out that it can refer to the primary time in which something started to change. He states outright that such a primary time does not exist at all (holōs). For 'there is no beginning of a change, at least there is no primary part of the time in which it embarked on change' ( a -).
 His argument here is a better one, although it is somewhat complex and its interpretation is controversial.
In broad outline, Aristotle argues as follows. He labels 'AD' the primary time in which x started its journey. His strategy will be to show that AD cannot be partless ( Again, if it were at rest in the whole of the stretch of time CA (for let us grant that it is at rest), then it would be at rest in A too, with the result that if AD is partless, it will simultaneously be at rest and have changed; for it is at rest at A and has changed at D.
We are assuming that the primary time in which x started its journey is AD, and we are supposing AD to be partless. Now, within this supposition that AD is partless, Aristotle considers two possibili- ἠρέμησεν; there, Aristotle shows that there is no primary time in which something embarks on rest, i.e. gets some resting done. For more on this, see sect.  below.) The imperfect might also seem appropriate because at the beginning of the change from being F to being G, when the thing has changed from being F, it is still changing, and the imperfect μετέβαλλεν might seem to capture this. But we have the easy-and paralleled-use of the ingressive aorist available. After eti at  a , Aristotle considers the second, and more familiar, possibility, namely that AD might be indivisible because it is an instant. This is equivalent to the supposition that A and D are identical. This option cannot be ruled out on metaphysical grounds alone, and so receives a more extended argument. Aristotle will show that under this supposition, the thing in question will still be at rest at A, and yet will have already moved at D-which, seeing that A and D are identical, is impossible.
He shows this by taking a stretch of time CA, where C is an instant somewhere in x's immediately preceding period of rest. If it is at rest during the whole of CA, then it will be at rest at A ( a -). Now, this is not an argument from, so to speak, the whole to the part. Rather, Aristotle is pointing out that if AD is the primary time in which x started its journey, and before x started its journey it was at rest (as opposed to just coming into existence at A), then x must also be at rest at A. For either x has got moving by A or it has not. If it has, then AD cannot be the primary time in which x  Ross, Physics, . I am grateful to Antony Eagle for showing me the naturalness of this interpretation. It might be tempting to think that two different instants are being denied to be contiguous, namely the indivisible primary time, identified as the first instant of motion, and the last instant of rest. This would then be step  of the argument given above on page : there is no first instant of motion because it would have to be contiguous with the last instant of rest. This is Bostock's position in his note ad loc. in R. Waterfield (trans.), Aristotle: Physics (Oxford, ), : 'Aristotle assumes that there is a last instant before the change begins, so if AD were a first instant at which the change has begun, these two instants would be next to one another. But that is impossible.' I have given reasons for thinking that Aristotle is not talking about first instants here, but even if he were, he certainly has not mentioned yet a last instant of rest. started to move, because it has already started to move by A. So it has not moved yet by A, and is therefore at rest. But, Aristotle argues, AD was supposed to be the primary time in which it started to move, so it must have started to move in AD. As Aristotle puts it, it is at rest at A, and yet must have moved at D ( a ). But A and D are identical, so there is a contradiction.
(ii)  a - () But if AD is not partless, it must be divisible and it must have changed in every part of it whatsoever, for () suppose AD is divided, then if it has changed in neither part, it will not have changed in the whole either, and () if it is changing in both, it is changing in the whole too, and () if it has changed in one or the other, the whole will not be the primary time in which it has changed. So it must therefore have changed in any part whatsoever. () It is clear then that the primary time in which the thing has changed does not exist. For () the divisions are endless.
In this text Aristotle shows that the primary time AD in which x started to change cannot be a stretch of time either, and then concludes in the final sentence () that, since it is not an instant and it is not a stretch, it does not exist. Proposition (), 'for the divisions are endless' ( a ), belongs with the proof that the primary time AD is not a stretch of time.
Recall that in  a - Aristotle showed that AD is not an instant, i.e. is not indivisible. Here, then, he considers the possibility that it is divisible, i.e. a divisible stretch of time. Aristotle wants to show that in this case too, no stretch AD can be the primary time in which x started moving. To show this, we first of all observe that if AD is the primary time of x's transition from rest to movement, then this transition is ongoing in any and every extended part of AD, as Aristotle says in (). For suppose we divide AD at some point, namely F. Then () if x started to move in neither AF nor FD, AD would not be the primary time in which x started to move. And () if x is moving in both, then it started moving in neither AF nor FD. And () if it started in one, and not the other, then AD could not be the primary time in which x had started to change. And so x must have started to change in both AF and FD-i.e. AD must indeed be the primary stretch of time in which x does the changing necessary to count as having got moving, and so x started changing across the whole of AD: every part of AD contains part of x's transition from rest to movement.
But now, if every part of AD contains part of x's transition from rest to movement, as it would have to if it were the primary time of x's transition, then AD cannot after all be the primary time in which x started to move, for the following reason. Let us focus on locomotion for a moment. Since AD is a stretch of time, x covered a certain amount of ground during it (if it did not, then it did not get going in it). But now, we can divide AD into two; x covered some ground in the first half, and some more ground in the second half. But then that first half of AD already contains x's starting to move. The second half of AD does not even look any more like a time during which part of x's transition occurred. Given that x covered some ground in that time, that period of time encompasses an occurrence which counts as x's starting to move. But of course, we can make the same observation about the first half of AD: we can divide it, and find always that in the first half of that division x has covered some ground, and so that stretch of time will encompass the transition. Hence, because we can always divide time at any point we want-as Aristotle puts it: 'the divisions are endless' ()-we can always find a substretch of AD which will count as the primary time in which x has started moving. Now, I have followed closely Aristotle's own argument of  a -. Notice that I have not talked of a 'first moment of change'. Nor did I have to suppose that there is a last moment of rest. The whole structure of the argument was simply that if there is such a primary time then there is no such primary time, and if the supposition that P implies that it is not the case that P, then it is not the case that P.
Does it follow from Aristotle's argument that there is no first moment at which x has started to change? Yes. For if there were a first moment of x's change (in the sense: a first moment at which x started to change), then it would be the primary time in which x started to move. But there is no such primary time. So there is no first moment of change (in that sense). But this is not what Aristotle tries to prove, although it is a corollary of what he says.
. An assumption One assumption that I am making is that if something has changed and is still changing at a particular instant, then it has already 'covered some ground' i.e. it has already changed over a certain magnitude, where this could mean that is has covered some ground, grown a certain amount, or increased by a certain weight, etc. It seems to me to be the assumption responsible for the result that Aristotle obtains, and it seems completely justified by the meaning of 'x has changed'. Indeed, Aristotle will go on in Physics . ,  b - a , to prove this result, with an argument that does not depend on what he proves in Physics . . (He starts from the simple thought that anything which has changed has changed from something to something. But distance, size, weight, or whatever are all divisible, and so the change must be divisible. Change does not happen by 'leaps'.) . Primary time of the end of a change, and the asymmetry between the beginning and the end I now want to return to Aristotle's argument that there is a primary time in which something finished changing. You will recall that this argument seemed only to establish that if there were such a primary time, it would be an instant. What we want is an argument which actually shows that there is such an instant. Now, the reason why we do in fact seem licensed to suppose that there is such an instant is that when something has finished changing, it is at rest. But if something has finished changing, it is not the case that it must have 'got some rest done'. As one might put it, in the case of motion: to arrive somewhere is not yet to have stayed still at that place (although it may be impossible to arrive somewhere without that arrival initiating a period of rest). So we have an asymmetry between the two cases Aristotle is discussing: (a) for something to count as having started changing, it must have got some changing done, and therefore it must have covered some ground in its change, but (b) for something to count as having finished changing, it is not the case that it must have been at rest already for a period of time. Case (a) allows one to run an argument like Aristotle's in  a -: when you try to single out when the thing started to change, you have to give a temporal indication which covers some amount of the change (otherwise you have not singled out when it got enough changing done to qualify as having changed), but any amount of the change your temporal indication covers will contain a part (the later of the two parts) which is not the transition from rest to motion. Case (b) does not allow such an argument, because there is no period of rest to appeal to.
In short, we can have a primary time of the end of a change, which is an instant, because there is no conceptual reason why there should not be an instant which is simultaneously one at which x finishes changing and at which x is at rest (presumably by being the limiting instant of a longer period at which x is at rest). However, we cannot have a primary time of the beginning of a change, where this is conceived of as being when x transitions to being in motion, because 'x has moved from being F ' implies that x has got some moving done, and no amount of moving is small enough to be the beginning of the motion. In slogans: 'x has finished changing' does not imply 'x has got some resting done', but 'x has started changing' does imply 'x has got some changing done'.
. First objection: there is no motion or rest at an instant
Many would produce an objection to Aristotle's arguments-and for that matter my interpretation of them-by pointing to Aristotle's notorious doctrine that nothing is moving or at rest in an instant, and then pointing out that my reconstruction of Aristotle's arguments makes liberal use of statements predicating motion or rest of something at an instant. It is true that Aristotle does say that nothing is moving in an instant,  and he extends this claim to being at rest: 'since nothing is of such a nature as to move in an instant, it is clear that nothing rests in an instant either'.
 But this statement is ambiguous between 'nothing can truly be said to be moving at an instant' and 'nothing can truly be said to move during an instant'. The second of these is, I judge, what Aristotle meant to say, not the first. That is, he meant to claim that nothing can get any movement done in an instant. Equally, in the same sense, nothing can get any rest done in an instant.

That this must be what Aristotle means is strongly suggested by the fact that he uses the notions of being at rest at an instant and being in motion at an instant throughout his complex discussion of the continuity of change. For instance, when giving his argument  Phys. . ,  a : οὐθὲν ἐν τῷ νῦν κινεῖται.  Phys. . ,  a -: ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐθὲν πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδ᾿ ἠρεμεῖν.  So-although this will be a case that Aristotle himself denies is possible-a swinging pendulum that is at rest momentarily at the end of each swing gets no rest done over a day's worth of swinging. You cannot add up all the instants and get, say, five minutes' worth of rest.
that there is no primary time in which something has changed, he claims (in the course of his argument) 'it is at rest in A' (en tōi Α ēremei,  a ). In an attempt to preserve the orthodoxy that Aristotle does not allow motion or rest at an instant, Richard Sorabji has argued that this statement is not something that Aristotle endorses in propria persona, but rather something that he concedes to his opponent, only to derive a contradiction from it.
 But whatever one makes of Aristotle's statement at  a , you only have to consider the primary time at which x has finished changing. This, as Aristotle remarks, is indivisible, i.e. an instant. (His argument for this may have been doubtful, but it is none the less what he claims.) However, at that instant x has finished changing (according to Aristotle)-and is therefore at rest. No doubt it does not get any resting done in that instant, but nothing precludes Aristotle from making statements about what is true of the object at that instant (namely, it finished changing and is at rest).
Of Aristotle's four arguments for why nothing is in motion in an instant (Physics . ,  a -b ), not all are easily taken as arguments for why something cannot get any motion or rest done in an instant. Perhaps in the end Aristotle did not clearly see the difference between moving at an instant and getting some motion done during an instant (as far as I can tell, the Greek is the same for both). But on balance, I think that Aristotle should not be taken to be committed to the view that there is no motion or rest at an instant. His position seems to be this: motion and rest take place over periods of time, and at any instants within those periods of time the object in question is actually in motion (or at rest). Being in motion or at rest at an instant is derivative from being in motion or at rest over a period which includes that instant.
 '[T]he reference to rest at an instant is more easily taken as ad hominem, not as representing Aristotle's own opinion' (R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (London, ),  n. ; his emphases). Bostock agrees ('Continuity', ; ). In arguing this, Sorabji is recanting his earlier view (in 'Aristotle on the Instant of Change' ['Instant'] , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl.  (), -), where he rightly claims that 'although [Aristotle] denies that things can change or remain in the same state at an instant, he concedes there are many other things that can be true of them at an instant' (), and identifies our passage as an instance of Aristotle making just such a predication, in propria persona ().  . Second objection: there is no primary time at which something at rest is at rest
In Physics .  Aristotle turns his mind to periods of rest. At  a - he states that there is no primary time when something rested.

At first glance it looks as if Aristotle is flatly denying that there could be a primary time at which something has stopped changing and is at rest, which would therefore be the primary time at which it came to a halt. If so, it appears that he is denying that there is a primary time of the end of a change! As Pierre Pellegrin translates it: 'il n'y a donc pas non plus de 〈moment〉 premier dans lequel [il vaudrait mieux dire: auquel] ce qui est en repos est arrivé en repos' ('Remarques', ). More carefully, Aristotle's argument for this is as follows. Suppose x has stopped changing at instant A. It is therefore at rest from instant A onwards. However, by the time of A, it has got no rest done yet. So what is the primary time in which it got some rest done? For any instant B later than A, AB cannot be the primary time in which x got some rest done, because such a period of time can always be divided ( a ) at a point C such that x will have got  οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ὅτε πρῶτον ἠρέμησεν ἔστιν.  Notice that Pellegrin supplies 'moment' with πρῶτον.  Pellegrin complains: 'Bien qu'il ne fasse pas une théorie du repos aussi dévelop-pée que sa théorie du changement, Aristote esquisse donc cette théorie du repos, et je ne comprends pas que B. Morison le nie' (ibid.). This section addresses that lack of comprehension. Sorabji also worries that what Aristotle says in .  is in tension with .  ('Instant', ).
 One needs to translate correctly the ingressive aorist ἠρέμησεν (see n.  above). some rest done in AC. So there is no primary time in which x has got some rest done ( a ). Note that this result concerning rest is mirrored exactly by change. Just as there is no primary time at which x got some amount of rest done, there is no primary time in which x got some amount of change done (this is what was shown in . ,  a -: there is no primary time in which something started to change). This nice mirroring confirms my reconstruction of the previous argument in . . The two arguments are virtually identical in structure: both possibilities, that the primary time be indivisible and that it be a stretch, are rejected, and this is followed by the reductio move. Moreover, in both cases the reductio move is followed by an explanation of why the primary time cannot be a stretch of time-an explanation which technically belongs to the second limb of the dilemma. So at . ,  AB, then something that moves at the same speed as x, starting at A, but stopping halfway (distance), will stop before x. At that point, before B, it will be in a condition of having moved a certain distance (half). So equally, x, when it is at that point, will have moved a certain distance. But if x has to be in the condition of having moved that distance halfway through AB, AB cannot be indivisible. (ii) Why is the primary time not a stretch of time? Well, if it is, then the thing is moving in all parts of the time (by the definition of primary time). This is impossible, so in fact 'there will not be a primary time' ( a -). This argument is obviously highly compressed. Aristotle observes that if the primary time is a stretch, then the thing is moving in all parts of the time (so much follows from the definition of primary time). But in that case, if we divide the primary time into two, then the thing is still moving in the second half of the time, and so it is coming to rest in the second half. But in that case, the second half of the original stretch is a better candidate for being the primary time. But there is an infinite supply of subparts of the stretch of time which will be better candidates for the primary time. If the last second is the primary time, what about the last half-second? And the last quarter-second? Etc. In each of these stretches, the thing is coming to rest. But there is no limit to how short a period in which it is coming to rest can be.
Since the only remaining option for the primary time of the thing's coming to rest, were it to exist, was that it was a stretch of time, and this has been shown to be impossible because of the infinite divisibility of time, then it follows that there is no primary time in which it is coming to rest.

One intriguing thing about this argument is the parallel Aristotle insists on between this result and some result concerning move- This represents my unpacking of the Aristotle's claim at  a -: ἐπεί οὖν χρό-νος ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἵσταται, καὶ οὐκ ἄτομον, ἅπας δὲ χρόνος εἰς ἄπειρα μεριστός, οὐκ ἔσται ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἵσταται. Aristotle's sentence has a slightly odd structure. The first half of the protasis of the ἐπεί clause ('the primary time in which the thing comes to rest is a stretch of time and not indivisible') is obviously not endorsed by Aristotle, since the apodosis denies the very existence of the primary time in which something comes to rest. The puzzle is that ἐπεί normally means 'since', and in sentences of the form 'since P, Q', 'P' is usually endorsed by the speaker. The only way to understand what is going on is to take the protasis not as expressing something Aristotle actually endorses, but as expressing the other live option at this point in the argument, namely that the primary time is a stretch of time (since, as has already been proven, it is not indivisible).  What is Aristotle referring to here? It must be a reference back to the claim in .  that there is no beginning of change, that is, that there is no primary time in which something embarks on motion. The reason why it must be a reference to this is that this is the only previous result he has shown concerning the non-existence of a primary time. (The other result he showed was the positive result that there is a primary time of the end of a change.) Thus, we must translate kineitai accordingly: 'just as there is no primary time in which the moving thing gets going, so there is no primary time in which the thing comes to rest'.  ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ κινεῖται, οὕτως οὐδ᾿ ἐν ᾧ ἵσταται τὸ ἱστάμενον.
 One way of seeing how κινεῖται can mean this is to think of the meaning of the active form, κινεῖν: it can mean to get something moving.

Aristotle chooses to express the first of these claims as the claim that a change has no beginning ( a ).
 And he chooses to express the second of these claims as the claim that a change has an end ( a ).
 Notice that he does not attempt to express any result about rest using the language of stopping and starting: 'x starts to be at rest', or 'x finishes being at rest' do not appear to be well formed for Aristotle. Thus, he formulates questions concerning when something starts to change and finishes changing, but does not raise questions in this form about rest. To express the idea behind 'embarking on a period of rest', he uses the ingressive aorist ( a : ēremēsen), a form which he also used of motion in .  ( a : metebalen-see n.  above). But when talking about rest, he does not employ the circumlocution with an auxiliary verb that he used of motion in .  to express embarking on motion ( a -: ērxato metaballein). Now, there is a primary time in which x finished changing. And this primary time is an instant. And even if x does not get any resting done in that instant, that instant does bound a period of rest for x. We also know that at the end of that period of rest, when x starts changing again, there is no start to that change. Does that mean that change is somehow open-ended at the start, but closed at the end, whereas rest is closed at the start, and open-ended at its end? I do not think so. We need to follow Aristotle's form of words very carefully. He says 'there is no beginning of a change; at least, there is no primary part of the time in which it embarked on change' (. ,  a -),  meaning that there is no primary time in which something started to change. This obviously does not mean that changes never start. It means rather that there is no way of pinning down exactly when something got enough changing done to count as having started. This aspect of his view (that there is no primary time in which something started to change) seems to be unobjectionable. To take the case of motion, Aristotle is claiming that we can say exactly when something arrived (this is when it finished moving), but we cannot say exactly when something left. An arrival is a punctual event whose precise timing can be pinned down. A departure is not-at least, if one understands by 'departure' a single event that takes place which qualifies something to count as having departed;  οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς.  ἔστι μεταβολῆς τέλος.  οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς, οὐδ ᾿ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ τοῦ χρόνου μετέβαλεν.
there just is no such event. But there are two things which do seem to be questionable about Aristotle's view. (i) Why identify the beginning of a change as when the changing thing started to change? (ii) Why conclude from the fact that there is no primary time when the thing started to change that there is no such thing as the beginning of the change, i.e. that if you cannot pin down when something has started to change, then there is no beginning of the change?
Let me take the two questions in turn. (i) Why does Aristotle identify the beginning of the change as when the thing started to change? To answer this, we have to identify what other options there might be. Presumably something can be starting to change without having started to change. Ordinary language certainly seems to allow this: 'Quick, the game is starting' we cry, when the players are forming up on the pitch. Aristotle identifies the start of a change with some part of the change, and then finds himself unable to pin down what that part is. But what if we took instead an instant when the thing is still at rest? One advantage of this way of looking at the matter is that one could then point to a parallel between the beginning and the end of a change: where the start of a change would be when something is starting to change (and is still at rest), so the end of a change is when something has finished changing (and is newly at rest). The start of a change, in this sense, would then have a primary time, namely the last instant of rest. I can see no reason why Aristotle could not agree with this-it is not inconsistent with what he says. After all, he says that 'there is no beginning of a change; at least, there is no primary part of the time in which it embarked on change' ( a -), and the epexegetic oude (which I have translated as 'at least') is consistent with the thought that there might be another way of explaining what the beginning of a change is. He is prompted to talk of the beginning of a change in these terms only because he is interested, at that point in the text, in the question of when something does the changing necessary to count as having changed (metabeblēken); he never asserted that this was the only way of understanding what might be meant by the beginning of a change.
Moreover, this is not his actual practice. When talking in De incessu animalium  about how humans get moving, Aristotle says: 'The manner in which we step out also shows that the origin of movement is in the right side; for all humans put the left foot foremost, and, when standing, preferably place the left foot in front, un-less they do otherwise accidentally' ( a -, trans. Forster, lightly adapted). Here, Aristotle seems perfectly happy to talk about what is going on when we start moving-presumably because he is talking about what happens when we take our first step. I conclude that in Physics .  Aristotle is denying that there is a beginning of a change only in one, specific, sense of 'beginning'.
The fact that there is a clear bounding instant at the beginning of a change-even if Aristotle chooses not to call it the beginning of a change in Physics -is reassuring. Changes are clearly delimited by bounding instants-the last instant of rest beforehand (at which x has not yet changed from its initial state), and the first instant of rest afterwards (at which x has changed to its final state). So effectively, Aristotle is committed to the theory that changes occupy open intervals of time.
 That we should interpret Aristotle this way is suggested by the fact that in both Phys. . ,  b -, and . ,  a -, he is comfortable referring to the primary time of the whole change from initial state to end state, and that primary time is a stretch of time-the stretch of time, I contend, between the two bounding instants.

So we do not have to conclude that changes are ineliminably vague, or anything like that. We could treat the bounding instant of a change as its start, or we could treat the first step of an animal's journey as the beginning of that journey. What Aristotle observes in .  is that as a matter of the logic of the concept of change, there is no privileged part of a change such that it is in virtue of having done that much changing that something should count as having changed. This does not threaten the fact that one can identify a bounding instant at the start of a change, and it does not threaten the possibility that for any given change, facts about what kind of  Cf. Sorabji: 'I am not saying that the period of motion has no boundary. It will have an instant bounding it on either side' ('Instant', ).
 Arnold Brooks draws my attention to Phys. . ,  a -b , where Aristotle argues that something cannot be in motion at an instant, because then it will also be able to be at rest in an instant, and then what are we to say of the instant bounding on one side a period of rest and on the other a period of change? The thing would be both at rest and in motion in that instant, and this is impossible. Brooks wonders whether this argument directly refutes my interpretation of Aristotle whereby the end of the change is also the bounding instant of rest, and my suggestion here that the beginning of change be identified with the bounding instant of rest. The solution is this: even though these bounding instants bound the periods of change, they are not instants at which the object is changing (or getting any change done), and so we are not led to claim that the object is both in motion and at rest at the same time.
change it is might contextually determine a candidate for the first part of it.
(ii) Why is it that Aristotle argues from the fact that there is no primary or exact time at which something has started to change that there is no beginning of change? He seems to have a thought such as the following: if there is no exact time in which an event or a process, or whatever, happens, then it does not really exist. But is that really a sufficient reason for denying its existence?
A useful way of seeing the puzzle here is to return to the comparison between places and times. I said before that something has a place iff it has a primary place. This works in the following way. All and only bodies with surroundings are in a place. The primary place of a body x-that in virtue of which x is in any part (proper or improper) of its surroundings-is the inner surface of these surroundings. There is nothing, therefore, which has surroundings which does not have a primary place. When I ask where some body x is, the answer which is given may be more or less precise (I have explained earlier what I mean by this). In other words, answers may specify more or less precisely where x is. Imprecise placesnon-primary places-feature in less precise answers, but the respondent is still attempting to say where x is. In general, exchanges such as the one I constructed before with the sequence of questions 'where is x?', each time eliciting a more and more precise answer-'Marx Hall', 'On the second floor', 'In room '-must have an end-point, according to Aristotle, namely at the specification of x's primary place. If there is no end to this sequence, then x has no place to be specified. Primary places are what guarantee occupancy of a place, i.e. to be in a place (en topōi) is to have a primary place.
Given the identical characterizations of a primary place and a primary time, it appears to follow that for something to be in time or in a time (en chronōi) is for something to have a primary time. There has to be a most precise specification of when something occurred for it to be possible to specify the time when it happened even imprecisely. Thus, Aristotle's thought seems to be that we cannot specify the precise time when the start of any change (in the sense of when the thing started to change) actually occurred. What Aristotle is denying is that there is a start of a change in the sense of there being some part of the change which counts as its beginning, since it can never be specified which instant or substretch of the change this would be.
But is the fact that we cannot say when something takes place (because it lacks a most precise specification of when it happens) enough to justify us in denying its existence? One of Aristotle's own doctrines seems to be available here to use against him. To motivate this, I need to talk about places again.
Although not everything has a place, everything which exists is somewhere, according to Aristotle. Basically, for x to have a place, x has to be related in an appropriate way to its surroundings, namely by being in contact with them. All things which exist and which either are not related in this way to their surroundings, or have no surroundings, have to be appropriately related to something which does have a place in order to count as being somewhere.
Consider some examples. Take the infamous goat-stag (cf. Phys. . ,  a ). It does not exist, so it is nowhere. Take knowledge (. ,  b ). It is somewhere in virtue of being in souls, and souls are in turn somewhere in virtue of being in bodies, which do have a place. Take heat (. ,  b -). This is an especially good example since we obviously locate heat. Most of us prefer to go somewhere where it is hot for our holidays, for instance; or to take an example more suited to Aristotle's biological explorations, animals seek warmth, or seek to be near warmth. Yet warmth is not the sort of thing to be in contact with its surroundings. Hot things, however, are, and that is Aristotle's answer: heat is somewhere in virtue of being a property (pathos) of bodies, which do have places. Lastly, take the top half of the water in a glass of water. It is not in contact with its surroundings-not entirely, anyway-since it is continuous with (rather than in contact with) the other half of the water. And yet we can locate it, since we locate it as part of something which does have a place, namely all the water in the glass.
With all these last-mentioned items, we can say where they are (knowledge, heat, parts), but we must understand that they are not somewhere because they have a place strictly speaking, but because they are related in various significant ways to things which do have places. In other words, such items as the ones I have just listed lack primary places (because they lack places), but we can still say where they are.
But I have been insisting throughout on the analogy between places and times for Aristotle. And so we need to ask ourselves why it could not be the case that the beginning of a change is the kind of item which does not have a primary time, and yet which can be 'located' in time, just as things like knowledge and heat can be located, even though they do not have primary places. The analogy looks to be promising. After all, Aristotle does actually believe that changes themselves have primary times (. ,  b -; . ,  a -) and they are paradigmatically things in time, neatly delineated by bounding instants (as I suggested in (i) above). Perhaps starts of changes (in the sense Aristotle is concerned with) are just related somehow to changes, such that we can actually say when they take place, even though they do not have primary times.
Ingenious though this might be, I think that to attempt such a move would miss the force of what exactly Aristotle is denying in . . For Aristotle's point is that there is no minimum length of time a change must take such that it counts as having started in virtue of having lasted at least that long. (In much the same way, if matter is infinitely divisible, one cannot say how much space something must take up in order to count as being extended, i.e. a minimum extension such that it is in virtue of something being extended by at least that much that it counts as being extended. A point is too small; anything else is too large.) If that is what someone means by the expression 'the beginning of a change', then it is indeed true that we cannot say when the beginning of a change is. If you want to think of the start of a change in the way I suggested above, as the bounding instant between the change and the prior period of rest, that is fine, and you can say when that happens. And if you want to consider the first step of an animal's journey as the beginning of its journey, that is fine too. But if you want to think of the start of any change as that privileged part of the change such that it is in virtue of the object having gone through that part of the change that it counts as having changed, then there are problems.
One cannot say that the start of a change (in the sense Aristotle is interested in here) is related to the change as heat or knowledge is related to a body with a place, because the start of a change (in this sense) is just the kind of thing which would, were it to exist, happen at a certain time. It is not that the start of the change, so understood, is metaphysically a different kind of thing from a change; the sort of start of a change that Aristotle has in mind is precisely supposed to be locatable in time, as a change is locatable in time. And the problem with such alleged beginnings of change is that they cannot take place in an instant (because the thing cannot get any changing done in an instant), and they cannot take place in a stretch, because al-though such a stretch would have a clearly defined first limit (the last instant of rest; instant A in Aristotle's argument in . ), it would have no determinate end limit. At any instant D you choose after A, the object will have changed a certain amount during AD, and hence you can choose a substretch of AD (starting at A, and ending, say, at B) such that the answer to the question 'did it start to move in BD?' will be no (and so AD is not the primary time of the start of the change). Starts of changes just are not clear-cut in the way that they should be if they are to have a primary time; if, in other words, they are to be properly speaking in time. There really is no such thing as the start of a change, where this is understood as a part of the change in which some changing gets done.
. How does this concern the student of nature?
What is the lesson that the student of nature should draw from this? I take it that it is something like the following. Physics and Biology can still make use of the notion of starting to do something. Indeed, Aristotle himself continues to do so. For instance, he investigates how animals get moving, in De incessu animalium. But in the light of Aristotle's investigations in the Physics, we need to remember that if we are going to talk of the start of a change (e.g. the start of an animal's journey to find food), then something other than the conceptual nature of change itself must be determining which stretch we are referring to. So, for instance, when we are talking about the beginning of the animal's journey, the context might determine that we are talking of its first step. Once we have absorbed the lessons of Physics , we can continue to talk about the starts of change, and the ends of change, and changes themselves, when they occur, etc., safe in the knowledge that we understand what we mean when we do so, and that we understand the pitfalls accompanying the notion. In much the same way, Aristotle can talk, in his biological works, of where the parts of the body are, safe in the knowledge that it has been established how parts of the body are somewhere in a different way from bodies themselves. The student of nature can carry on deploying the concept of change in her explanations of the world, despite the recalcitrant difficulties which that concept offers. 
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